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Abstract 
How	do	High-Growth	Firms	(HGFs)	affect	the	rest	of	the	economy?	We	explore	this	question	using	
Hungarian	administrative	microdata.	Relying	on	the	Birch	definition	of	HGFs,	we	find	evidence	for	
stronger	productivity	growth	for	firms	operating	in	industries	with	more	HGFs	and	for	firms	supplying	
industries	with	more	HGFs.	Knowledge	spillovers	or	the	surge	of	HGFs’	demand	for	intermediate	inputs	
could	explain	these	positive	associations.	Firms	with	intermediate	productivity	levels	seem	most	likely	to	
benefit	from	this	effect,	while	we	find	no	differences	by	age	or	export	status.	The	results	hold	
irrespective	of	the	level	of	spatial	aggregation	and	are	robust	to	alternative	definitions	of	HGFs	as	well	as	
different	measures	of	productivity	or	spillover.		
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1. Introduction 
Promoting	job	creation	is	a	policy	priority	for	many	governments.	Owing	to	their	potential	contribution	
to	this	goal,	High-Growth	Firms	(HGF)	–	firms	with	a	significant	ability	to	grow	rapidly	–	have	increasingly	
attracted	the	attention	of	policymakers.	Programs	catering	to	these	firms	tend	to	rely	on	broad	policy	
instruments,	similar	to	those	used	to	support	SMEs.	Autio	et	al.	(2007)	and	the	World	Bank	(2018)	offer	
a	review	of	the	evidence	on	these	measures	from	advanced	and	developing	countries,	respectively.	
However,	framing	such	policies	only	in	terms	of	job	creation	is	simplistic,	because	the	welfare	effects	of	
these	policies	also	depend	fundamentally	on	the	overall	effects	of	HGFs	on	the	economy.	
Much	attention	in	the	literature	and	among	policymakers	has	focused	on	the	performance	of	HGFs	and	
the	jobs	created	by	them.	But	HGFs	may	also	generate	externalities	for	other	firms	or	agents	in	the	
economy,	which	should	also	be	taken	into	account	when	designing	policies.	Following	the	literature	on	
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foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	(Keller,	2010),	we	use	the	term	spillovers2	for	these	effects,	which	
includes	knowledge	spillovers,	linkages	and	other	effects.3		
The	sign	and	magnitude	of	these	spillovers	is	ambiguous	theoretically.	On	the	one	hand,	HGFs	may	exert	
competitive	pressures	on	input	and	output	prices,	crowding	out	other	firms.	They	may	poach	workers	
from	competitors,	put	upward	pressure	on	labor	and	other	input	costs,	or	drive	output	prices	down	by	
exploiting	economies	of	scale.	On	the	other	hand,	HGFs	may	generate	positive	spillovers.	HGFs	may	
develop	or	possess	knowledge	of	technology,	business	organization	or	markets	that	can	be	transferred	
to	other	firms	through	the	movement	of	employees	or	demonstration.	Knowledge	transfer	is	likely	to	
occur	over	relatively	short	distances,	through	face-to-face	contact	with	clients	or	suppliers,	or	within	the	
local	labor	market.	In	addition,	HGFs'	high	demand	for	inputs	may	generate	opportunities	for	suppliers	
to	exploit	economies	of	scale	(Javorcik,	2004),	and/or	facilitate	technology	upgrading.	Because	of	their	
advanced	production,	management,	marketing	or	other	skills,	HGFs	may	sell	high-quality	or	innovative	
inputs,	benefitting	downstream	firms	using	those	inputs.		
Assessing	whether	it	is	the	positive	or	negative	spillovers	that	dominate	is	the	empirical	question	we	
explore	in	this	paper.	We	rely	on	detailed	firm-level	administrative	data	from	Hungary	and	exploit	
regional	and	time	variation	in	the	share	of	HGFs	to	infer	their	connection	with	the	performance	of	other	
related	firms.	We	distinguish	between	horizontal	(within	the	same	2-digit	industry)	and	vertical	(across	
industries)	spillovers.	We	identify	HGFs	as	firms	in	the	top	5	percentile	according	to	the	Birch	Index	
(Birch,	1981),	which	is	preferable	to	the	alternative	OECD	definition	as	the	Birch	definition	provides	a	
less	skewed	identification	of	HGFs	and	is	not	subject	to	the	macro	cycle.		
In	our	empirical	strategy,	we	carefully	adapt	the	methods	in	the	FDI	spillover	literature	to	the	HGF	
environment.	From	a	technical	point	of	view,	a	crucial	difference	is	that	the	HGF	phase	is	more	transient	
than	the	FDI	one,	which,	in	turn,	limits	the	application	of	fixed	effects	methodologies	employed	in	the	
FDI	literature.	Instead,	we	follow	Javorcik	(2004),	who	uses	first	differences	regression	to	difference	out	
the	firm	fixed	effects.	To	be	specific,	we	regress	log	differences	of	firm	outcomes	on	the	level	of	spillover	
measures	and	firm	controls.	We	also	run	separate	regressions	on	the	sample	restricted	to	non-HGFs	and	
interact	the	HGF	status	with	the	spillover	measures	to	investigate	the	effects	on	non-HGFs.	Relatedly,	in	
contrast	with	the	FDI	case,	the	share	of	HGFs	is	mechanically	linked	to	the	growth	distribution,	
generating	challenges	discussed	in	the	peer	effect	literature	(see,	for	example,	Angrist,	2014).	We	
handle	this	problem	by	excluding	firms	in	the	same	narrowly	defined	(4-digit)	industry	from	the	
calculation	of	spillover	measures.	Lastly,	unobserved	demand	shocks	can	confound	the	relationship	
between	high	growth	and	productivity	increase	in	related	industries.	While	we	employ	a	large	set	of	
fixed	effects	to	control	for	these	shocks,	our	results	can	be	interpreted	as	a	correlation	between	the	high	
share	of	HGFs	and	productivity	growth	rather	than	a	causal	relationship.		
																																								 																				
2	Our	paper	–	similarly	to	many	others	in	the	spillover	literature	–	does	not	provide	unambigous	evidence	for	
causal	effects,	even	if	the	term	’spillover’	may	itself	suggest	directionality	and	causality.	Still,	we	use	this	term	with	
the	caveat	that	our	results	can	mostly	be	interpreted	as	correlations.		
3	Spillovers	are	externalities	in	the	sense	that	they	are	unlikely	to	be	priced	in	when	the	HGF	makes	the	decision	
whether	to	grow	or	not,	but	they	may	have	been	priced	in	for	firms	at	the	receiving	end	(e.g.	if	wages	increase	
because	of	the	higher	demand	for	workers	by	HGFs	in	a	given	sector/locality)	or	not	(e.g.	if	a	technology	is	adopted	
by	other	firms	as	workers	move	from	HGFs	to	other	firms).	
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We	find	evidence	of	positive	spillovers.	Rather	than	attracting	workers	from	or	reducing	profits	of	non-
HGFs,	HGFs’	presence	is	linked	with	improvements	in	productivity,	income	and	employment	of	other	
local	firms	either	in	the	same	industry	or	in	supplier	industries.	By	estimating	markups	following	De	
Loecker	and	Warzynski	(2012),	we	show	that	the	gains	in	revenue	TFP	seem	to	result	from	a	
combination	of	higher	markups	and	higher	physical	productivity.		
Spillovers	vary	by	sector,	the	absorptive	capacity	of	firms,	and	the	HGF	status	itself.	Firm	age	and	export	
status	do	not	matter	for	the	effects.	Manufacturing	firms	compared	to	services	firms	gain	more	from	
HGFs	presence	in	the	same	industry	and	downstream	industries.	Firms	with	medium	productivity	levels	
appear	to	gain	most	from	HGFs’	presence	in	downstream	sectors.	This	may	be	explained	by	the	low	
absorptive	capacity	of	low	productivity	firms,	and	the	looser	relations	between	local	markets	and	the	
most	productive	firms,	which	tend	to	have	more	outside	options.	HGF	presence	affects	both	HGFs	and	
other	firms,	but	slightly	differently:	only	non-HGFs	appear	to	benefit	from	vertical	linkages.		
Our	results	hold,	albeit	to	a	lesser	extent,	when	we	use	the	OECD	definition	of	HGF:	within-industry	
spillovers	are	robust	to	different	definitions	of	HGFs,	while	across-industry	spillovers	are	not	found.	The	
results	are	robust	to	alternative	definitions	of	HGF	spillover	measures,	productivity	measures,	sample	
and	different	sets	of	fixed	effects	and	industry	controls.		
We	contribute	to	several	strands	of	the	literature.	First,	we	build	on	and	add	to	the	literature	on	the	role	
of	entrepreneurship	in	development	and	growth.	This	literature	emphasizes	that	while	entrepreneurship	
in	general	is	a	key	determinant	of	economic	growth	and	employment	(Carree	and	Thurik,	2010),	a	subset	
of	entrepreneurs,	often	called	high-impact	entrepreneurs,	contribute	disproportionately	to	employment	
and	economic	growth	(Autio	et	al.,	2007).	The	literature	also	emphasizes	some	key	functions	of	high-
impact	entrepreneurs:	they	apply	existing	knowledge	in	innovative	ways	(Audretsch,	2005)	and	operate	
where	demand	or	supply	characteristics	were	unknown	(Ács,	2010).	Both	activities	yield	new	knowledge,	
at	least	locally,	thus	having	the	potential	to	create	externalities.	Our	paper	contributes	to	a	better	
understanding	of	the	effects	generated	by	such	entrepreneurs.			
The	entrepreneurship	literature	is	partly	motivated	by	the	literature	on	the	role	of	industrial	policy	in	
development.	Hausmann	and	Rodrik	(2003)	interpret	development	as	a	process	of	discovering	a	
country’s	cost	structure	when	producing	different	goods.	In	general,	this	type	of	self-discovery	is	under-
provided	because	of	public	good	problems	(Rodrik,	2005).	High	impact	entrepreneurs	can	play	a	key	part	
in	providing	such	self-discovery,	as	they	are	likely	to	investigate	production	functions	and	generate	
externalities	via	learning	by	doing	for	firms	in	similar	activities.	Our	analysis	of	inter-industry	spillover	
effects	resulting	from	HGFs	may	also	inform	industrial	policy.		
Second,	we	expand	the	growing	literature	on	HGFs	by	examining	the	relationship	between	the	presence	
of	HGFs	and	the	performance	of	other	firms.	Thus	far,	the	literature	has	focused	mostly	on	the	
identification	of	these	fast-growing	firms	and	their	characteristics.	HGFs	tend	to	be	more	productive,	
younger,	engaged	in	scientific	R&D	and	computer	programming,	but	are	not	concentrated	in	any	given	
sector	(Coad	et	al.,	2014a;	OECD,	2016).	Du	and	Temouri	(2015)	study	the	relationship	between	high	
growth	and	productivity	and	find	that:	(i)	HGFs	are	more	likely	to	exhibit	stronger	TFP	growth;	and	(ii)	
firms	are	more	likely	to	increase	their	TFP	after	experiencing	a	high-growth	episode.	Nonetheless,	a	
small	but	growing	literature	is	exploring	the	spillover	effects	generated	by	HGFs.	Coad	et	al.	(2014b)	
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investigate	the	type	of	workers	HGFs	tend	to	hire.	They	find	that	HGFs	only	hire	a	significant	number	of	
workers	from	other	firms	after	realizing	some	rapid	growth;	in	the	earlier	phases	they	hire	younger,	less	
educated	workers	who	have	often	experienced	a	fairly	long	unemployment	period.	The	industry-level	
analysis	by	Bos	and	Stam	(2011)	finds	that	the	presence	of	HGFs	is	associated	with	stronger	subsequent	
industry	growth	in	the	Netherlands.	We	contribute	to	the	literature	by	providing	firm-level	evidence	of	
the	relationship	between	the	presence	of	HGFs	and	the	performance	of	other	firms.		
Third,	we	extend	the	productivity	spillover	literature,	which	has	focused	on	the	effects	of	foreign	firms.	
The	literature	has	often	found	positive	spillovers	for	firms	supplying	sectors	with	more	foreign	firms	(or	
backward	spillovers).4	Other	studies	show	that	positive	spillovers	may	result	from	intentional	or	non-
intentional	technology	transfer	from	foreign	firms	to	suppliers	arising	from	higher-quality	or	productivity	
requirements	(Blalock	and	Gertler,	2008),	or	owing	to	access	to	a	higher	quality,	larger	variety	or	lower	
priced	pool	of	inputs	(Javorcik,	2004).	Reyes	(2017)	focuses	specifically	on	FDI	spillover	effects	on	local	
HGFs	in	developing	countries	and	finds	that	multinational	enterprises	integrated	into	global	value	chains	
are	likely	to	generate	stronger	spillovers	than	FDI	aimed	at	serving	the	local	market.	We	contribute	to	
this	literature	by	investigating	a	different	source	of	spillovers.	We	also	discuss	and	propose	solutions	for	
new	methodological	challenges	which	emanate	from	the	more	transient	nature	of	the	HGF	phase	
relative	to	FDI.5	This	contributes	to	the	generalizability	of	the	FDI	spillover	methodology	to	other	
problems.		
The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	provides	a	simple	conceptual	framework	to	situate	the	
discussion.	Section	3	describes	the	data	used,	the	construction	of	the	main	variables	of	interest	and	the	
empirical	strategy.	Section	4	presents	our	results.	Finally,	Section	5	concludes.		
2. Conceptual framework 
Our	study	investigates	the	association	between	HGFs	and	the	productivity,	growth	and	income	of	firms	
in	the	economy	in	several	ways.	We	borrow	from	the	FDI	literature	to	comprehend	the	spillover	effects	
of	HGFs.	The	two	main	possible	channels	are	knowledge	spillovers	and	pecuniary	externalities	working	
via	supplier-buyer	linkages.	While	the	FDI	spillover	literature	has	focused	mainly	on	the	former,	recent	
work	has	emphasized	that	most	studies,	often	unintentionally,	measure	both	effects	(Havranek	and	
Irsova,	2011;	Keller,	2010).	
Both	channels	may	be	relevant	in	the	HGF	case.	There	is	certainly	a	potential	for	knowledge	spillovers	if	
HGFs	possess	more	advanced	knowledge	relative	to	other	firms;	this	takes	place	when	workers	in	HGFs	
leave	and	bring	along	their	specialized	knowledge	(labor	mobility)	or	non-HGFs	imitate	HGFs	
(demonstration	effect).	While	the	case	for	a	potential	technological	advantage	is	clearer	in	the	FDI	
spillover	case,	HGFs	may	possess	very	relevant	knowledge	about	technological,	organizational	or	
marketing	solutions	which	are	crucial	for	operating	more	effectively	in	the	specific	context.		While	HGFs	
are	no	more	common	in	innovative	industries,	HGFs	are	more	innovative	in	their	industry,	which	allows	
them	to	grow	faster	than	their	industry	peers	(Moreno	and	Coad,	2015).		
																																								 																				
4	See,	for	example,	Görg	and	Greenaway	(2004)	and	Harrison	and	Rodríguez-Clare	(2010)	for	a	summary	of	the	
literature	on	spillover	effects	from	foreign	firms.	
5	Though	there	is	evidence	that	FDI	has	a	transitory	effect	on	suppliers’	productivity;	see	Merlevede	et	al.	(2014).	
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Indeed,	HGFs	in	Hungary	are	more	productive	than	non-HGFs.	To	illustrate	technological	differences,	
Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	shows	the	distribution	of	TFP	(relative	to	industry-year	mean)	for	
HGFs	and	non-HGFs	separately.	We	find	that	the	productivity	distribution	of	HGFs	stochastically	
dominates	that	of	non-HGFs.	The	means	of	the	two	distributions	differ	by	36	log	points	and	this	
difference	is	highly	significant	(t=36).	Similar	differences	are	present	for	other	performance	measures,	
too.	These	patterns	suggest	that	HGFs	use	more	productive	technologies,	in	line	with	a	potential	to	
knowledge	spillovers.	
	
Figure	1	The	distribution	of	TFP	(relative	to	industry-year	mean)	for	HGFs	and	non-HGFs	
	
Note:	This	figure	shows	kernel	density	(log)	TFP	for	HGFs	and	non-HGFs	separately.	The	TFP	is	estimated	with	the	
ACF	procedure,	and	demeaned	at	the	industry-year	level;	therefore,	it	shows	how	productive	firms	are	relative	to	
the	industry	mean	in	the	given	year.		
	
HGFs	may	also	generate	pecuniary	externalities	via	their	supplier-buyer	linkages.	HGFs	can	generate	
spillovers	by	simply	generating	more	demand.	Larger	demand	may	help	firms	in	further	exploiting	
economies	of	scale	or	investing	in	technological	upgrading.	The	larger	demand	of	HGFs	can	also	result	in	
increased	competition	in	the	output	or	input	markets,	exerting	negative	spillovers.	Stronger	competition	
in	the	output	markets	may	result	in	lower	prices	and	quantities,	reducing	the	opportunities	of	non-HGFs	
firms	to	utilize	economies	of	scale	or	grow.	In	the	input	markets,	HGFs	can	potentially	poach	the	best	
workers	and	drive	up	the	wages	for	all	firms	in	the	same	region.	Coad	et	al.	(2014b)	show,	however,	that	
there	is	little	evidence	that	HGFs	would	poach	the	best	workers	during	their	high	growth	phase.		
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While	our	empirical	framework	does	not	allow	us	to	perfectly	identify	whether	non-HGFs	are	benefiting	
due	to	changes	in	economies	of	scale	or	technology	investment,	we	control	for	changes	in	the	
economies	of	scale	to	capture	the	latter	effect	to	some	degree6	--	we	follow	Javorcik	(2004)	by	
controlling	for	the	demand	of	upstream	industries.	Next,	we	recognize	that	our	main	productivity	
measure	(TFP)	is	revenue-based	(De	Loecker	and	Warzynski,	2012;	De	Loecker	et	al.,	2016),	which	
conflates	changes	in	physical	productivity	with	potential	changes	in	markups.	This	issue	is	highly	relevant	
not	only	because	HGFs	themselves	are	likely	to	gain	market	power	during	their	growth	phase,	but	also	
because	the	increased	demand	or	supply	generated	by	these	firms	can	drive	up	markups	of	suppliers	
and	buyers.	We	follow	the	methodology	of	De	Loecker	and	Warzynski	(2012)	to	estimate	the	
relationship	between	HGF	presence	and	markups,	and	include	the	markups	as	control	in	the	productivity	
regressions.		
Lastly,	the	FDI	literature	also	shows	that	the	spillover	effects	are	heterogeneous	across	firms.	A	key	
concept	in	the	FDI	literature	is	the	absorptive	capacity	of	receiving	firms	(Girma,	2005;	Zhang	et	al.,	
2010).	Firms	with	a	stronger	knowledge	base	or	absorptive	capacity	may	be	more	able	to	learn	from	
HGFs,	more	likely	to	become	suppliers	of	those	firms	and	are	more	likely	to	react	with	technology	
upgrading	to	increased	competition	rather	than,	say,	cutting	costs.	As	common	in	the	spillover	
literature,	we	will	proxy	absorptive	capacity	by	the	TFP	level	of	the	receiving	firm.	We	also	explore	if	firm	
age	and	exporter	status	can	affect	the	relationships	between	the	presence	of	HGFs	and	the	firm	
performance	of	non-HGFs.		
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Data  
Our	main	source	of	information	is	the	firm-level	corporate	income	tax	statements	during	the	period	
1998-2014	from	the	Hungarian	National	Tax	Authority	(NAV).	The	dataset	has	almost	universal	coverage	
as	it	includes	all	firms	that	require	double-entry	bookkeeping.7	The	sample	covers	more	than	95	percent	
of	employment	and	value	added	of	the	business	sector	and	about	55	percent	of	the	full	economy	in	
terms	of	GDP.	The	dataset	includes	information	on	a	wide-range	of	matters	such	as	ownership,	financial	
information,	employment,	and	industry	at	the	NACE	4-digit	code	level	and	the	location	of	their	
headquarters.	The	Centre	for	Economic	and	Regional	Studies,	Hungarian	Academy	of	Science	(CERS-HAS)	
has	extensively	cleaned	and	harmonized	the	data.	
Given	the	scope	of	our	analysis,	we	restrict	the	data	in	several	ways.	First,	we	exclude	non-profit	
organizations.	Second,	we	drop	firms	that	operate	either	in	agriculture	or	in	the	non-market	service	
sectors	of	the	economy.8	Third,	we	drop	all	firm-year	observations	with	less	than	5	employees.9	Finally,	
																																								 																				
6	Note	that	this	inability	to	distinguish	between	these	two	channels	is	present	in	most	FDI	spillover	studies.	
Recently,	Fons-Rosen	et	al.	(2017)	isolated	the	channels	of	knowledge	spillovers	and	demand	effects	that	foreign	
firms	have	on	domestic	firms.	They	use	firm-level	patent	data	to	construct	a	measure	of	knowledge	spillovers	from	
FDI.		
7	Only	sole	traders	and	very	small	firms	are	not	required	to	use	double-entry	bookkeeping	in	Hungary.		
8	Non-market	services	sectors	are	sectors	53,	58,	75,	84	to	94,	and	96	to	99,	based	on	NACE	rev	2.	
9	We	do	this	to	avoid	overestimating	the	incidence	of	HGFs.	Besides,	these	micro-sized	firms	are	likely	to	include	
individual	entrepreneurs	who	operate	a	formal	firm	to	reduce	their	tax	burden	(Semjén	et	al.,	2009),	and	many	
small	firms	are	likely	to	underreport	their	sales,	earning	and	wages	paid	(Tonin,	2011).	
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we	drop	all	firm-year	observations	with	missing,	negative	or	zero	employment,	turnover,	material	cost,	
capital	or	value	added.	As	we	will	discuss	in	detail	in	section	3.3,	our	regressions	will	be	run	for	3-year	
intervals,	which	further	reduces	the	number	of	observations.	We	also	restrict	the	sample	to	surviving	
firms,	given	our	primary	interest	in	TFP	change.	Finally,	we	exclude	firms	which	operate	in	the	capital,	
Budapest.10	Our	final	regression	sample	consists	of	more	than	140,000	firm-year	observations.11		
The	data	include	the	most	important	balance	sheet	items.	Nominal	variables	were	deflated	by	the	
appropriate	2-digit	industry	level	deflators	from	OECD	STAN.12	We	rely	on	two	proxies	of	productivity:	
labor	productivity	measured	as	value	added	over	employment	and	total	factor	productivity	(TFP).	We	
estimate	TFP	using	the	semi-parametric	methods	in	Ackerberg	et	al.	(2015)	but	will	also	present	results	
based	on	other	methods	(Wooldridge,	2009,	and	with	fixed	effects)	to	check	for	robustness.	We	also	
estimate	markups	following	De	Loecker	and	Warzynski	(2012)	and	use	them	as	dependent	variables	and	
as	control	in	the	productivity	regressions.	The	dependent	variables	in	our	regressions	are	3-year	changes	
in	these	productivity	measures,	markups,	employment,	sales,	average	wage	and	return	on	assets	(ROA).	
We	winsorize	these	long	differences	at	the	5th	and	95th	percentiles	of	their	distribution,	calculated	
separately	for	each	2-digit	industry-year	pair.		
As	for	the	construction	of	our	main	explanatory	variable,	there	are	multiple	definitions	that	exist	for	
HGFs	in	the	literature.	A	key	difference	between	these	definitions	is	whether	they	rely	exclusively	on	(i)	
relative	or	(ii)	absolute	growth	rates.	The	former	tends	to	identify	HGFs	as	mostly	small	firms,	while	the	
latter	provides	a	less	skewed	identification.	As	all	theoretical	spillover	channels	–	either	via	vertical	
linkages	or	the	labor	market	–	are	likely	to	be	stronger	when	they	originate	from	larger	firms,	the	latter	
measure	is	more	likely	to	capture	these	externalities.	Hence,	that	is	our	preferred	approach,	but	we	also	
show	the	results	under	an	alternative	definition.	Specifically,	we	choose	to	identify	HGFs	based	on	the	
Birch	index	(Birch,	1981),	computed	for	all	firms	with	at	least	5	employees	in	year	𝑡:	𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑐ℎ!" = (𝑒𝑚𝑝!!! − 𝑒𝑚𝑝!) 𝑒𝑚𝑝!!!𝑒𝑚𝑝! 	
We	rank	firms	according	to	their	𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑐ℎ!"	values	for	each	year	and	classify	a	firm	as	HGF	if	their	Birch	
index	is	above	the	95th	percentile	in	that	year.	The	constant	and	absolute	threshold	generates	variation	
across	industries,	regions	and	years.		
																																								 																				
10	We	do	this	for	two	reasons.	First,	many	larger	firms	register	their	headquarters	in	Budapest	even	though	most	of	
their	activities	are	conducted	elsewhere.	Second,	Budapest,	with	20%	of	firms	and	being	a	very	large	geographic	
entity	compared	to	other	counties	or	microregions,	represents	an	outlier.	Our	results	are	robust	to	including	
Budapest	in	the	sample.	
11	The	full	sample	includes	a	total	of	1.7	million	observations	for	our	regression	years	(1998,	2001,	2004,	2007,	
2009,	2011);	320,000	firms	have	at	least	5	employees	and	260,000	firms	are	observable	for	at	least	3	years.	From	
these,	we	have	all	the	variables	to	estimate	TFP	for	210,000	firms,	from	which	we	exclude	70,000	because	they	
operate	in	Budapest.	
12The	OECD	STAN	includes	value	added,	capital,	intermediate	input	and	output	price	deflators.	When	a	variable	has	
a	specific	deflator,	we	deflate	it	with	that,	while	we	deflate	all	other	variables	with	the	output	price	deflator.	
Naturally,	this	process	does	not	control	for	within-industry	price	differences.	
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As	a	robustness	check,	we	estimate	the	regressions	with	the	OECD	definition	of	HGFs,	whereby	a	firm	is	
high-growth	if	it	employs	at	least	5	employees	at	the	beginning	of	the	period	and	has	an	annualized	
employment	growth	rate	of	at	least	20	percent	for	a	period	of	3	years	(OECD,	2010).	
By	definition,	the	share	of	Birch-HGFs	is	5	percent	for	the	full	sample	in	each	year.	There	are	some	
differences	across	industries,	with	the	majority	of	HGFs	in	high-tech	manufacturing	industries.13	The	
OECD	definition	shows	similar	patterns	across	industries,	but	by	construction	it	also	varies	across	years,	
following	the	macro	cycle	(Table	A1	in	the	Appendix	presents	the	share	of	HGFs	by	different	types	of	
sectors	according	to	the	Birch	index	and	OECD	definitions).14		
Importantly,	the	dataset	allows	us	to	exploit	the	detailed	geographical	information	of	each	firm.	The	
data	on	the	municipality	of	the	firms’	headquarters	are	used	to	construct	our	spillover	measures.	
Municipalities	are	the	smallest	geographical	unit	of	measurement	in	Hungary:	they	can	be	aggregated	
up	to	174	microregions,	where	each	microregion	tends	to	include	one	city	and	the	neighboring	smaller	
settlements.	The	microregions	can	be	grouped	into	20	counties,	including	Budapest,	which	can	be	
further	aggregated	into	7	regions,	representing	the	NUTS-2	geographic	aggregation.15		
The	choice	of	the	geographical	unit	to	create	the	spillover	variables	is	essential	to	reduce	spurious	
results.	A	highly	aggregated	geographical	unit	may	result	in	spurious	correlations	between	the	spillover	
and	firm	performance	variables.16	We	consider	the	spillovers	from	HGFs	at	the	level	of	counties	and	
microregions	as	they	can	suggest	different	spillover	channels.	Counties	are	likely	to	involve	many	
supplier-buyer	relationships	as	firms	within	a	value-chain	tend	to	co-locate	near	each	other.17	
Microregions	are	the	relevant	unit	of	observation	of	local	labor	markets,	and	thus	may	be	the	
appropriate	unit	for	the	analysis	of	knowledge	spillovers	via	labor	mobility.		
3.2. Constructing the spillover measures 
HGFs	can	affect	non-HGFs	in	their	industry	or	in	sectors	that	buy	from	or	sell	to	them.	Without	detailed	
firm-to-firm	transaction	data,	the	buyer	and	seller	linkages	are	established	through	national	input-
output	tables,	following	the	vertical	spillover	literature	(Javorcik,	2004).	To	construct	the	spillover	
																																								 																				
13	We	rely	on	Eurostat’s	indicators	on	high-tech	industry	and	knowledge-intensive	services.	Manufacturing	
industries	are	grouped	in	four	categories:	high-tech,	medium-high-tech,	medium-low-tech	and	low	tech.	Services	
are	organized	in	knowledge-intensive	services	and	other	services.	
14	The	relatively	large	HGF	share	in	high-tech	manufacturing	over	many	years	is	somewhat	in	contrast	with	findings	
in	the	literature	(Daunfeldt	et	al.,	2016;Henrekson	and	Johansson,	2010).	The	World	Bank	(2018)	shows	that	while	
there	may	be	more	HGFs	in	high-tech	sectors	in	Hungary,	there	is	no	consistent	pattern	of	HGFs	in	high-tech	
sectors	across	many	developing	countries.		The	table	shows	that	this	is	partly	driven	by	the	peculiarities	of	the	
Birch	definition,	but	the	share	of	HGFs	is	still	large	in	these	industries	according	to	the	OECD	definition,	suggesting	
that	high-tech	manufacturing	was	indeed	quite	dynamic	in	this	period	in	Hungary.	
15	The	NUTS	(Nomenclature	of	Territorial	Units	for	Statistics)	system	of	classifying	geographical	units	is	the	
standard	statistical	system	used	for	all	European	Union	member	countries.		
16	This	issue	has	been	identified	as	the	Modifiable	Areal	Unit	Problem	(MAUP).	See	Briant	et	al.	(2010)	for	a	
discussion.		
17	Hillberry	and	Hummels	(2008)	show	that	spatial	frictions	reduce	trade	drastically,	and	attribute	this	fall	to	the	co-
location	of	firms	within	a	value-chain.	
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measures,	we	first	calculate	the	share	of	HGFs	in	the	industry.	Let	𝐻𝑆!"#	be	the	employment-weighted	
share	of	HGFs	in	(2-digit)	industry	𝑗,	region	(county	or	microregion)	𝑟,	and	year	𝑡:18		𝐻𝑆!"# = 𝑒𝑚𝑝!"𝐻𝐺𝐹!"!∈!" 𝑒𝑚𝑝!"!∈!" 	
where	 𝑒𝑚𝑝!"!∈!" 	is	the	total	number	of	employees		in	industry	𝑗	in	region	(county	or	microregion)	𝑟	
and	year	𝑡,	and	𝐻𝐺𝐹!"	is	an	indicator	variable	that	equals	1	if	firm	i	is	an	HGF.	𝐻𝑆!"#	accounts	for	the	
firms	with	at	least	5	employees	and	an	HGF	phase	starting	in	year	𝑡,	𝑡 − 1	or	𝑡 − 2.	The	results	are	
robust	to	using	an	alternative	definition	of	HGFs	where	sales	are	used	as	weights.	
The	upstream	and	downstream	measures	are	based	on	the	average	share	of	HGFs	in	supplier	and	buyer	
industries	in	the	region,	weighted	by	the	volume	of	intermediate-good	flows	across	other	industries.	
Importantly,	when	calculating	these	measures	for	a	given	firm,	we	omit	said	firm’s	2-digit	industry	from	
the	computation	to	capture	only	genuine	inter-industry	spillovers.	Buyer-seller	connections	are	
identified	using	information	from	the	2-digit	(symmetric	harmonized)	input-output	matrices	for	Hungary	
provided	by	the	OECD:19		 𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝐻𝐺𝐹!"# = 𝛼!"𝐻𝑆!"#!!! 	
and	 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝐻𝐺𝐹!"# = 𝛼!"𝐻𝑆!"#!!! 	
where	𝛼!" 	are	the	normalized	coefficients	from	the	symmetric	input-output	matrix	representing	
(domestic)	intermediate	good	flows	from	industry	𝑚	to	𝑗,	and	𝛼!"	are	coefficients	representing	
intermediate	goods	flows	from	industry	𝑗	to	𝑚.		
We	also	control	for	within-industry	spillovers	by	calculating	the	share	of	HGFs	in	the	firms’	2-digit	
industry;	using	data	on	all	entities	with	the	same	2-digit	code,	save	for	the	ones	that	belong	to	the	firm’s	
own	4-digit	industry20	(denoted	by	𝑔).	Thus,	this	measure	is	calculated	as:	𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛- 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝐺𝐹!"# = 𝐻𝐺𝐹!"!∈!" − 𝐻𝐺𝐹!"!∈!"𝑒𝑚𝑝!"!∈!" − 𝑒𝑚𝑝!"!∈!" 	
Note	that	𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛- 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝐺𝐹!"#$	is	very	close	to	the	`traditional’	horizontal	spillover	measure,	as	
defined	in,	for	example,	Javorcik	(2004).	The	difference	is	that	we	omit	the	firm’s	4-digit	industry,	to	
																																								 																				
18	For	consistency	with	the	regression	sample,	we	calculate	the	spillover	measures	based	on	the	subsamples	of	
firms	with	at	least	5	employees.		
19	Source:	http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IOTS.	These	tables	are	available	only	between	2000-
2011,	so	we	have	used	the	2011	weights	for	the	years	after	2011	and	the	2000	weights	for	the	years	before	2000.	
20	The	sub-industry	is	narrowly	defined	as	it	describes	one	specific	economic	activity.	An	example	is	subindustry	
10.11,	namely,	the	processing	and	preserving	of	meat.	The	second	measure	is	the	share	of	HGFs	in	the	firm’s	
industry	defined	as	the	2-digit	NACE	code.	The	industry	is	more	broadly	defined	since	it	captures	many	economic	
activities.	Using	the	same	example,	the	processing	and	preserving	of	meat	will	be	grouped	together	with	the	
production	of	meat	products	under	industry	10,	and	the	manufacture	of	food	products.	
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avoid	generating	spurious	correlation.	If	all	firms	–	including	HGFs	–	are	in	the	sample,	then	the	high	
growth	of	the	HGF	will	show	up	both	in	the	HGF	measure	and	on	the	left-hand	side.	Omitting	HGFs	from	
the	regressions	would	introduce	endogenous	selection	based	on	the	dependent	variable.21	We	also	
report	results	restricted	to	non-HGFs	and	interact	the	spillover	variables	with	the	HGF	status	of	the	firm,	
and	these	results	are	similar	to	the	results	on	the	full	sample,	which	are	in	line	with	HGFs	generating	
externalities	for	other	firms.22	
Table	1	shows	summary	statistics	of	our	key	spillover	measures	and	firm	outcomes.	The	employment	
share	of	Birch	HGFs	was	14.5%	on	average	in	a	2-digit	industry-country	combination,	with	substantial	
variation.	The	average	value	of	the	vertical	measures	is	higher,	reflecting	the	fact	that	sectors	with	more	
HGFs	have	stronger	linkages	with	other	sectors.23			
Table	1	Summary	statistics	for	the	regression	sample	
Variable	 Obs	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	
Downstream	HGF	 140,271	 0.234	 0.050	 0.000	 0.507	
Upstream	HGF	 140,271	 0.215	 0.049	 0.000	 0.373	
Within-industry	HGF	 140,271	 0.145	 0.173	 0.000	 0.987	
Labor	prod	(3-year	change)	 140,271	 0.042	 0.536	 -1.064	 1.183	
TFP	ACF	(3-year	change)	 140,271	 0.068	 0.670	 -1.257	 1.571	
Log	employment	(3-year	change)	 140,271	 -0.077	 0.423	 -1.099	 0.647	
log	sales	(3-year	change)	 140,271	 -0.036	 0.519	 -1.174	 0.940	
log	average	wage	(3-year	change)	 140,271	 0.169	 0.274	 -0.337	 0.746	
ROA	(3-year	change)	 140,271	 -0.026	 0.169	 -0.408	 0.322	
Notes:	This	table	shows	summary	statistics	of	the	main	variables	for	the	regression	sample.	HGF	spillover	measures	
are	based	on	the	3-year	Birch	employment-based	definition	and	weighted	by	the	number	of	employees.	TFP	
estimation	is	based	on	the	Ackerberg	et	al.	(2015)	approach,	at	the	2-digit	industry	level,	using	the	sample	of	firms	
with	at	least	5	employees.		
	
3.3. Empirical strategy 
The	specification	for	our	baseline	regression	model	is:	Δ𝑦!" = 𝛽! ∗! 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟!"#! + 𝛾𝑋!" + 𝜇!" + 𝜌!" + 𝜀!"	
where	𝑖	indexes	firms,	𝑔	(4-digit)	industries,	𝑟	counties,	𝑠	1-digit	sectors,	𝑅	NUTS2	regions	and 𝑡	years.	Δ𝑦!"	is	the	three-year	growth	rate	(between	𝑡	and	𝑡 + 3)	of	the	main	firm	performance	variables:	labor	
																																								 																				
21	Note	that	the	situation	differs	from	the	FDI	spillover	case	in	two	respects.	First,	running	the	regression	on	always	
domestic-owned	firms	makes	sense	in	that	literature;	and	second,	the	spillover	variable	is	not	derived	directly	from	
the	dependent	variable	in	the	FDI	case.	These	differences	motivate	our	deviation	from	that	literature.	
22	Note	that	there	are	alternatives	to	this	solution,	for	example,	subtracting	the	given	firm’s	status	from	the	HGF	
measure.	This,	however,	would	generate	a	number	of	other	problems,		explored	by	the	peer	effects	literature	
(Angrist,	2014).	We	think	that	our	approach	is	a	clear	and	transparent	one.		
23	This	broadly	reflects	that	manufacturing	has	a	larger	weight	in	input-output	tables	and	the	employment	share	of	
Birch	HGFs	is	larger	in	manufacturing.		
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productivity,	TFP,	employment,	sales,	average	wages	(all	of	these	in	logs),	and	ROA.24	𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟!"#! 	are	
the	three	different	measures	of	spillovers	(m={	downstream,	upstream	and	within-industry})	and	𝛽!	are	
the	corresponding	spillover	relationships.	𝑋!"	captures	three	firm	level	characteristics,	all	related	to	
productivity	growth:	(log)	employment,	labor	productivity	and	capital	intensity	(or	log(fixed	
assets/employee)).	Note	that	these	variables	are	included	as	levels	in	year	𝑡,	an	initial	value	before	the	
growth	measured	by	the	dependent	variable.	Following	Javorcik	(2004)	we	also	control	for	the	change	in	
demand	in	buyer	industries	in	all	specifications.	Together	with	differencing	the	dependent	variable,	they	
are	likely	to	capture	a	rich	set	of	heterogeneous	firm-level	characteristics.		
We	also	include	two	types	of	fixed	effects	to	capture	industry-level	and	regional	shocks.	First,	we	include	
industry-year	fixed	effects,	𝜇!",	to	control	for	sectoral	macro-shocks.	Second,	we	include	region-year	
fixed	effects,	𝜌!",	to	control	for	regional	macro-shocks.	Both	types	of	fixed	effects	are	measured	at	a	
somewhat	more	aggregated	level	than	the	spillover	variables	themselves,	to	allow	for	some	variation	
across	industries	within	sectors,	and	across	counties	within	regions.25		
Given	that	both	the	dependent	variable	and	the	spillover	variables	are	calculated	for	3-year	periods,	
running	the	regression	at	the	annual	level	would	inflate	the	number	of	observations	artificially.	
Therefore,	we	run	the	regressions	for	3-year	periods	(with	a	small	modification	at	the	end	of	the	
sample).26	The	periods	included	are	1998-2001,	2001-2004,	2004-2007,	2007-2010,	2009-2012,	and	
2011-2014.		
Our	identification	strategy	relies	on	variation	from	three	main	sources:	geographic	variation	within	
regions,	industry	variation	within	sectors	and	time	variation	(and	the	interactions	of	these	variables).	We	
show	that	the	results	are	robust	to	alternative	specifications.	Across-industry	cross-sectional	variation	is	
important	for	our	results.	This	is	because	within	industry	variation	is	quite	limited	for	several	reasons.	
First,	there	is	limited	variation	of	links	in	input-output	tables	and	HGF	shares	in	2-digit	industries.	
Second,	many	periods	are	involved	when	measuring	the	dependent	and	the	spillover	variables.	The	
dependent	variable	captures	firm	growth	between	periods	𝑡	and	𝑡 + 3,	which	depends	on	changes	
during	this	period,	including	firms	starting	their	high	growth	period	in	any	of	these	years.27	The	
explanatory	variables	consider	firms	which	start	their	high	growth	period	between	𝑡 − 2	and	𝑡.	
Consequently,	in	the	empirical	specification	one	‘year’	observation	consists	of	changes	across	5-6	years,	
even	not	considering	delayed	effects	of	high	growth	phases.	Useful	time	variation	is	quite	limited.		
To	clarify	further	our	empirical	strategy,	we	contrast	it	with	the	usual	method	employed	in	the	FDI	
spillovers	literature.	From	a	technical	point	of	view,	an	important	difference	between	the	two	empirical	
																																								 																				
24	We	winsorize	these	3-year	changes	at	the	5th	and	95th	percentiles.	While	this	’winsorizes’	HGFs	from	the	left-
hand	side,	we	find	this	sensible	given	that	the	aim	is	to	estimate	the	relationship	between	HGF	activity	and	the	
growth	of	the	average	firm,	and	winsorizing	outliers	helps	with	estimating	a	more	precise	effect	on	the	mean.	
Winsorizing	does	not	affect	our	results	in	a	significant	manner.	
25	For	the	fixed	effects:	industries	are	defined	as	sections,	which	are	2-digit	divisions	aggregated	to	the	level	
identified	by	an	alphabetical	code	in	NACE	revision	2;	and	regions	include	typically	3	counties,	at	the	level	most	of	
our	variables	are	measured.		
26	As	the	full	sample	covers	17	years,	not	divisible	by	3,	the	three	last	periods	intersect.	
27	Consider	firms	which	start	their	high	growth	phase	in	T+2,	which	may	clearly	affect	firm	growth	between	t	and	
t+3.	These	firms	will	even	be	considered	HGFs	in	t+5.	
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exercises	is	that	HGF	status	is	much	more	transient	than	foreign	ownership:	most	firms	that	are	foreign	
or	become	foreign	owned	remain	in	that	state.	As	a	result,	in	typical	FDI-spillover	equations	(e.g.	
Harrison	and	Rodríguez-Clare,	2010),	the	dependent	variable	is	the	level	of	productivity	and	the	
equation	is	estimated	with	firm	fixed	effects.	This	method	is	less	appropriate	here	as	HGF	status	is	less	
persistent.	It	is	more	intuitive	in	our	setting	to	check	whether	productivity	growth	is	higher	when	more	
firms	are	experiencing	a	high-growth	phase	in	vertically	related	industries.	The	empirical	specification	is	
analogous	to	the	differenced	regressions	in	Javorcik	(2004),	which	differences	out	time-invariant	firm	
characteristics.		
A	second	difference	with	respect	to	the	FDI	literature	emerges	concerning	the	horizontal	measures	of	
spillovers.	In	the	FDI	spillover	literature,	the	horizontal	measure	includes	the	foreign	firm	but	the	
regression	is	conducted	on	the	sample	of	domestic	firms.	This	method	is	hard	to	apply	to	our	setting.	
Restricting	the	sample	to	non-HGFs	would	lead	to	the	endogenous	exclusion	of	firms	with	the	strongest	
growth	performance.	Therefore,	we	run	our	main	regression	on	the	full	sample,	but	report	in	Table	5	
that	we	find	similar	results	when	the	sample	is	restricted	to	non-HGFs	and	when	we	interact	the	
spillover	variables	with	the	HGF	status	of	the	firm.	
In	summary,	our	identification	strategy	attempts	to	use	sensible	temporal	assumptions	together	with	a	
set	of	fixed	effects.	Still,	our	results	are	conservatively	interpreted	as	correlations.	It	is	possible	that	
there	are	unobserved	industry	characteristics	which	may	partly	drive	this	correlation.	Also,	reverse	
causality	is	possible:	stronger	productivity	growth	of	suppliers	may	help	their	buyers	to	grow	rapidly.	
Given	that	regressions	aimed	at	predicting	HGF	status	usually	have	a	low	explanatory	power,	it	is	
unlikely	that	one	can	find	credible	instruments	for	regional	HGFs	presence.	Consequently,	we	deem	our	
strategy	a	relatively	transparent	and	credible	way	to	document	the	correlation	between	HGFs	and	
productivity	growth	in	related	industries.		
4. Results 
We	first	report	the	main	results,	and	then	discuss	the	heterogeneous	effects	and	robustness	checks.	
Importantly,	we	report	beta	coefficients	in	all	tables	because	the	spillover	measures	do	not	have	a	very	
intuitive	unit	of	measurement.	The	original	coefficients	can	be	calculated	with	the	help	of	the	standard	
deviations	in	Table	1,	on	which	we	sometimes	rely	when	interpreting	the	results.	
4.1. Main firm-level regression results 
Our	main	results	are	reported	in	Table	2.	First,	productivity	growth	is	positively	correlated	with	HGF	
share	in	the	same	and	vertically	related	industries	(columns	1	and	2).	The	beta	coefficients	show	that	
one-standard-deviation	increase	in	HGF	share	is	associated	with	a	1.5-2	percent	of	a	standard	deviation	
larger	increase	in	productivity	in	the	same	industry	and	a	2-3	percent	of	a	standard	deviation	larger	
increase	in	supplier	industries.	These	relationships	are	significant	also	from	an	economic	perspective,	
representing	about	a	1-1.5	percentage	points	of	additional	productivity	growth	in	the	same	industry	and	
1.5-2	percent	higher	growth	in	supplier	industries	in	three	years.	These	results	are	consistent	with	
positive	productivity	spillovers	both	within	subsectors	and	from	buyers	to	sellers.		
Second,	the	presence	of	HGFs,	especially	within	the	same	2-digit	industry	and	buyer	industries,	is	
associated	with	stronger	growth	of	other	firms	(columns	3	and	4).	The	presence	of	HGFs	in	downstream	
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industries	is	associated	with	higher	sales	growth,	but	no	extra	growth	in	employment.	This	is	consistent	
with	HGFs	generating	additional	demand,	which	may	drive	the	premium	in	productivity	growth.28		
Table	2	Main	regression	results		
	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Dependent:	
Productivity	 Size	 Income	
Labor	prod.	 TFP	 Emp.	(ln)	 Sales	(ln)	
av.	wage	
(ln)	 ROA	
Downstream	HGF	share	 0.032***	 0.023***	 -0.000	 0.017***	 0.022***	 0.012***	
	
(7.397)	 (4.370)	 (-0.039)	 (3.824)	 (5.246)	 (2.656)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 -0.002	 -0.002	 0.001	 0.001	 0.003	 0.001	
	
(-0.330)	 (-0.302)	 (0.110)	 (0.112)	 (0.435)	 (0.106)	
Within-industry	HGF	share	 0.015***	 0.020***	 0.008**	 0.012***	 -0.004	 0.012***	
	
(3.866)	 (3.523)	 (2.411)	 (2.751)	 (-0.773)	 (2.875)	
Demand	 0.003	 0.011*	 0.008*	 0.013***	 0.011**	 -0.003	
	
(0.808)	 (1.918)	 (1.898)	 (2.604)	 (2.298)	 (-0.586)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	
R-squared	 0.215	 0.152	 0.085	 0.070	 0.162	 0.095	
Note:	This	table	investigates	the	relationship	between	the	presence	of	HGFs	in	upstream	and	downstream	
industries	as	well	as	in	the	same	sector,	and	3-year	change	in	the	different	dependent	variables.	The	dependent	
variables	are	changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	
are	reported	and	t-values	are	reported	in	parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-industry	(2-
digit	NACE)-year	level.	Firms	are	classified	as	HGFs	based	on	the	3-year	Birch	employment	definition.	
	
Third,	potential	productivity	gains	will	be	distributed	between	the	two	key	stakeholders	of	firms:	
employees	(through	higher	wages,	column	5)	and	owners	(through	higher	return	on	assets,	ROA,	column	
6).	In	fact,	both	workers	and	owners	benefit	from	HGFs	in	supplier	industries,	while	the	higher	
productivity	associated	with	higher	HGF	share	in	the	same	industry	seems	to	benefit	only	owners.	
Table	3	attempts	to	shed	some	light	on	what	drives	the	productivity	increase.	The	first	two	columns	
examine	whether	the	TFP	estimation	method	matters.	In	column	1	we	estimate	productivity	with	the	
simple	fixed	effects	estimator	rather	than	the	ACF	procedure.	In	column	2	we	address	the	concern	that	
HGF	status	may	be	associated	with	an	increase	in	market	share	and,	therefore,	an	increase	in	market	
power.	We	address	this	issue	by	including	the	firm’s	market	share	in	the	4-digit	industry	and	county	into	
the	first	step	of	the	productivity	estimation	procedure.	Results	remain	mostly	unchanged	in	the	different	
specifications.		
An	even	more	consequential	question	is	whether	the	increase	in	the	revenue-based	TFP	is	driven	by	an	
increase	in	prices	and	markups	or	by	an	increase	in	physical	productivity.	In	column	3	the	dependent	
																																								 																				
28	As	the	estimation	uses	a	revenue-based	productivity	measure,	the	higher	productivity	levels	can	also	be	a	result	
of	higher	product	prices	or	profits	that	are	driven	up	by	the	additional	demand	from	HGFs.	
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variable	is	the	firm-year	level	markup.	We	indeed	find	that	HGF	presence	is	associated	with	higher	
markups.	HGFs	seem	to	drive	up	the	prices	both	of	firms	in	the	same	subsector	and	in	supplier	
industries,	in	line	with	the	increased	demand	hypothesis.	In	columns	4	and	5	we	re-estimate	the	main	
productivity	equations	controlling	for	the	change	in	markup.	As	expected,	revenue-based	productivity	is	
strongly	positively	associated	with	markups.	However,	we	find	evidence	that	HGF	presence	is	associated	
with	higher	productivity	even	when	controlling	for	markups,	though	its	effect	is	halved.	These	results	
suggest	that	a	substantial	portion	of	the	positive	externality	of	HGFs	is	explained	by	higher	prices,	but	
physical	productivity	may	also	increase.29	
Table	3	Other	productivity	measures	and	markups	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
	Dependent:	 TFP	(FE)	 TFP	(ACF,	MS)	 Markup	 Lab.	Prod	 TFP	(ACF)	
Downstream	HGF	share	 0.023***	 0.023***	 0.022***	 0.017***	 0.011**	
	
(5.007)	 (4.294)	 -5.387	 (6.120)	 (2.462)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 -0.001	 -0.003	 -0.005	 0.001	 0.000	
	
(-0.181)	 (-0.378)	 (-0.861)	 (0.384)	 (0.072)	
Within-industry	HGF	share	 0.024***	 0.020***	 0.019***	 0.002	 0.009**	
	
(4.451)	 (3.726)	 -5.037	 (0.886)	 (1.982)	
Demand	 0.008	 0.016**	 -0.003	 0.005*	 0.013**	
	
(1.608)	 (2.475)	 (-0.609)	 (1.769)	 (2.488)	
Markup	(3-year	change)	
	 	 	
0.679***	 0.569***	
	 	 	 	
(182.291)	 (150.074)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	
R-squared	 0.171	 0.150	 0.229	 0.571	 0.401	
Note:	The	table	replicates	Table	2,	column	2	but	relying	on	different	productivity	measures.	The	dependent	
variables	are	changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	
are	reported	and	t-values	are	reported	in	parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-industry	(2-digit	
NACE)-year	level.	Firms	are	classified	as	HGFs	based	on	the	3-year	Birch	employment	definition.	FE	stands	for	Fixed	
Effects,	and	MS	for	Market	Share	(included	in	the	first	estimation	step).	Markups	are	estimated	based	on	the	De	
Loecker-Warzynski	(2012)	method.	
	
Taken	together,	the	results	indicate	that	HGF	presence	in	the	same	industry	is	associated	with	higher	
growth	in	productivity	and	size.	Downstream	productivity	spillovers	are	also	positive,	resulting	from	
increased	sales	with	a	similarly	sized	workforce.		We	find	that	the	increase	in	measured	TFP	results	from	
a	combination	of	increased	markups	and	physical	productivity.	
																																								 																				
29	Even	though	the	estimated	markup	is	significant	and	meaningful,	we	decided	against	including	it	as	a	control	in	
the	remaining	tables	because	we	think	that	including	would	lead	to	important	econometric	problems,	such	as	
simultaneity.		
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4.2. Which firms benefit? 
The	spillover	effects	can	vary	along	several	observable	dimensions,	which	may	shed	some	light	on	the	
underlying	mechanisms,	especially	on	the	role	of	knowledge	spillovers	in	these	associations.	First,	we	
examine	whether	the	relationships	differ	by	industry,	age	and	export	status.	Second,	we	investigate	
whether	HGFs	are	more	likely	to	benefit	from	the	presence	of	other	HGFs	than	other	firms.	Third,	we	
study	whether	absorptive	capacity,	proxied	by	the	TFP	level	of	the	receiving	firm,	matters.	Finally,	we	
check	the	importance	of	geographical	proximity	in	these	relationships.		
Table	4	splits	the	sample	by	sector,	age	and	export	status.	We	find	evidence	of	a	positive	relationship	
between	productivity	growth	and	within-industry	HGF	presence	for	both	manufacturing	and	services	
firms.	Vertical	linkages	are	more	important	in	manufacturing,	where	input-output	linkages	may	be	more	
pronounced.30	We	do	not	find	heterogeneity	in	terms	of	age,	indicating	that	not	only	young,	but	also	
established	firms	can	learn	from	HGFs.	We	also	find	that	exporting	and	non-exporting	firms	can	benefit	
from	HGF	presence	to	a	similar	extent.	Even	though	exporters	tend	to	be	more	productive	than	non-
exporters,	being	exposed	to	more	HGFs	downstream	and	within	the	industry	is	associated	with	higher	
productivity	growth.		
Table	4	Results	with	different	subsamples	
Dependent:	 Labor	productivity	growth	between	t	and	t+3	
Sample:	
Manufactur
ing	 Services	 Young	 Old	
Non-
exporter	 Exporter	
Downstream	HGF	share	 0.049***	 -0.011	 0.020***	 0.037***	 0.031***	 0.029***	
	
(6.823)	 (-1.500)	 (3.315)	 (7.669)	 (6.987)	 (4.335)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 0.034***	 0.001	 -0.005	 -0.000	 -0.004	 0.008	
	
(3.061)	 (0.299)	 (-0.656)	 (-0.075)	 (-0.759)	 (0.851)	
Within-industry	HGF	
share	 0.012*	 0.013**	 0.014***	 0.016***	 0.017***	 0.015***	
	
(1.950)	 (2.300)	 (2.710)	 (3.447)	 (4.443)	 (2.636)	
Demand	 0.015**	 -0.002	 0.011*	 0.001	 0.002	 0.003	
	
(2.031)	 (-0.409)	 (1.655)	 (0.192)	 (0.497)	 (0.467)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 34,419	 105,852	 38,935	 101,336	 105,533	 34,733	
R-squared	 0.185	 0.224	 0.262	 0.190	 0.229	 0.193	
Note:	The	table	splits	the	sample	to	Manufacturing/Services,	Young	(less	than	5-year-old)/Old	firms	and	
exporters/non-exporters	and	re-runs	the	main	regressions	on	these	subsamples.	The	explanatory	variables	show	
the	share	of	HGFs	in	different	industries	in	the	same	county,	by	using	the	2-digit	input-out	matrix	from	OECD	STAN.	
The	dependent	variables	are	changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	
Beta	coefficients	are	reported	and	t-values	are	reported	in	parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	
county-industry	(2-digit	NACE)-year	level.	The	firm	controls	are	log	employment,	labor	productivity	and	log	capital	
																																								 																				
30	These	distinctions	may	capture	the	different	breadth	of	industries	in	manufacturing	and	services,	rather	than	
substantive	differences	between	the	two	groups.	
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per	labor	ratio.	The	definition	of	HGF	is	the	3-year	Birch	employment	definition.	
	
One	may	also	ask	whether	HGFs	will	benefit	more	or	differently	from	the	presence	of	other	HGFs	than	
other	firms.	While	HGFs	may	have	a	stronger	interest	in	learning	about	growth	opportunities	or	new	
technologies,	non-HGFs,	which	are	probably	more	strongly	anchored	to	the	local	market	may	benefit	
more	from	the	expanding	demand	of	HGFs.		
Table	5	investigates	this	question	in	two	ways.	Panel	A	restricts	the	sample	to	non-HGFs,	and	the	results	
are	very	similar	to	those	in	Table	2	showing	that	we	indeed	identify	the	effect	of	HGFs	on	other	firms	in	
our	main	specification.	Methodologically,	it	also	shows	that	the	main	results	are	not	driven	by	the	
mechanical	relationship	of	HGFs	having	higher	growth	rates.		In	Panel	B	we	allow	for	the	spillover	effects	
to	differ	between	HGFs	and	non-HGFs	by	introducing	interactions	between	the	spillover	variables	and	
the	receiving	firms’	HGF	status.	As	in	Panel	A,	the	results	for	non-HGFs	are	very	similar	to	the	main	
specification,	while	we	also	find	that	HGFs	only	benefit	from	within	industry	spillovers.	Therefore,	
horizontal	spillovers	seem	to	affect	both	HGFs	and	non-HGFS,	while	vertical	linkages	are	more	likely	to	
benefit	non-HGF	firms.		
Table	5	Main	results	for	non-HGF	firms	
PANEL	A:	Restricted	to	non-HGF	
		 Productivity	 Size	 Income	
Dependent:	 Labor	prod.	 TFP	 Emp.	(ln)	 Sales	(ln)	
av.	wage	
(ln)	 ROA	
Downstream	HGF	
share	 0.033***	 0.024***	 -0.006	 0.012***	 0.022***	 0.012**	
	
(7.629)	 (4.446)	 (-1.448)	 (2.734)	 (5.160)	 (2.557)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 -0.004	 -0.003	 0.003	 0.002	 0.002	 -0.000	
	
(-0.675)	 (-0.424)	 (0.599)	 (0.280)	 (0.312)	 (-0.078)	
Within-industry	HGF	
share	 0.014***	 0.019***	 0.007**	 0.011**	 -0.005	 0.011***	
	
(3.588)	 (3.244)	 (1.970)	 (2.409)	 (-0.903)	 (2.661)	
Demand	 0.003	 0.012*	 0.009**	 0.013**	 0.010**	 -0.004	
	
(0.682)	 (1.887)	 (1.968)	 (2.538)	 (2.054)	 (-0.794)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 133,601	 133,601	 133,601	 133,601	 133,601	 133,601	
R-squared	 0.211	 0.148	 0.083	 0.064	 0.161	 0.096	
PANEL	B:	Interact	with	HGF	status	
		 Productivity	 Size	 Income	
Dependent:	 Labor	prod.	 TFP	 Emp.	(ln)	 Sales	(ln)	 av.	wage	(ln)	 ROA	
Non	HGF	X	
Downstream	HGF	
share	 0.048***	 0.034***	 -0.008	 0.018***	 0.030***	 0.017***	
	
(7.755)	 (4.502)	 (-1.383)	 (2.911)	 (5.076)	 (2.713)	
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Non	HGF	X	
Upstream	HGF	share	 -0.005	 -0.005	 0.005	 0.003	 0.003	 -0.000	
	
(-0.672)	 (-0.506)	 (0.706)	 (0.378)	 (0.350)	 (-0.054)	
Non	HGF	X	Within-
industry	HGF	share	 0.013***	 0.017***	 0.009***	 0.012***	 -0.005	 0.011***	
	
(3.397)	 (3.109)	 (2.626)	 (2.689)	 (-0.937)	 (2.708)	
HGF	X	Downstream	
HGF	share	 0.015	 0.021	 -0.018**	 0.006	 0.035***	 -0.005	
	
(1.197)	 (1.560)	 (-2.343)	 (0.603)	 (2.922)	 (-0.426)	
HGF	X	Upstream	
HGF	share	 0.026*	 0.016	 -0.013*	 -0.001	 0.008	 0.021	
	
(1.944)	 (1.061)	 (-1.651)	 (-0.040)	 (0.617)	 (1.520)	
HGF	X	Within-
industry	HGF	share	 0.014***	 0.020***	 -0.012***	 -0.004	 0.004	 0.005	
	
(4.540)	 (5.188)	 (-5.502)	 (-1.435)	 (1.309)	 (1.497)	
Demand	 0.003	 0.011*	 0.009**	 0.014***	 0.011**	 -0.003	
	
(0.807)	 (1.916)	 (2.140)	 (2.741)	 (2.296)	 (-0.573)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	
R-squared	 0.217	 0.154	 0.179	 0.116	 0.162	 0.095	
Note:	This	table	investigates	whether	the	effect	of	HGF	presence	differs	between	HGFs	and	other	firms.	
Panel	A	restricts	the	sample	to	non-HGFs	while	Panel	B	interacts	the	spillover	measures	with	the	HGF	and	
non-HGF	dummies.	The	explanatory	variables	show	the	share	of	HGFs	in	different	industries	in	the	same	
microregion	and	county,	by	using	the	2-digit	input-out	matrix	from	OECD	STAN.	The	dependent	variables	
are	changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	
are	reported	and	t-values	are	reported	in	parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-
industry	(2-digit	NACE)-year	level.	Firm	controls	are	log	employment,	labor	productivity	and	log	capital	per	
labor	ratio.	The	definition	of	HGF	is	the	3-year	Birch	employment	definition.	
	
Next,	we	investigate	whether	the	strength	of	the	relationship	depends	on	the	absorptive	capacity	of	the	
non-HGFs	(Table	6).	We	proxy	the	absorptive	capacity	with	the	productivity	level	of	the	firm	in	the	initial	
year	(t).	More	productive	firms	are	more	likely	to	attract	the	business	of	rapidly	growing	buyers	or	may	
benefit	more	from	knowledge	spillovers	because	of	their	better	absorptive	capacity.	Specifically,	to	test	
these	hypotheses,	we	split	the	sample	into	four	productivity	quartiles	within	each	industry-year	
combination	in	the	initial	year	and	run	the	main	specifications	in	these	subsamples.31	Therefore,	for	
example,	column	1	in	Table	6	shows	the	main	regression	run	on	the	sample	of	firms	which	were	in	the	
lowest	quartile	of	the	productivity	distribution.	We	find	some	evidence	of	heterogeneity,	as	productivity	
effects	are	stronger	for	firms	with	a	medium	level	productivity,	with	significant	differences	between	the	
middle	quartiles	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	lower	and	upper	quartile	on	the	other.	Firms	with	very	low	
productivity	levels	may	lack	the	capabilities	to	learn	from	HGFs	or	supply	them	effectively,	while	highly	
																																								 																				
31	The	quartiles	are	created	based	on	labor	productivity.	For	each	firm	we	calculate	the		quartile	for	each	period,	
and	take	the	modal	quartile	to	ensure	that	firms	do	not	move	across	subsamples.	
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productive	firms	may	already	have	easy	access	to	domestic	and	international	markets	and,	therefore,	
their	performance	is	less	dependent	on	local	HGFs.	This	difference	is	robust	to	taking	deciles	instead	of	
quartiles,	to	using	the	other	two	TFP	measurements,	and	to	employing	the	OECD	definition	of	HGF	
instead	of	the	one	developed	in	Section	3.		
Table	6	HGF	presence	for	firms	in	different	initial	productivity	level	quartiles		
Panel	A:	 Labor	productivity	growth	between	t	and	t+3	
Sample:	productivity	quartile	in	year	t	 1st		 2nd		 3rd		 4th		
Downstream	HGF	share	 0.012*	 0.040***	 0.046***	 0.018***	
	
(1.809)	 (6.228)	 (7.540)	 (2.746)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 -0.006	 0.019***	 -0.013*	 -0.013*	
	
(-0.748)	 (2.596)	 (-1.845)	 (-1.696)	
Within-industry	HGF	share	 0.001	 0.011**	 0.010*	 0.005	
	
(0.131)	 (1.969)	 (1.712)	 (0.858)	
Demand	 -0.014*	 0.010	 -0.006	 0.007	
	
(-1.822)	 (1.493)	 (-1.002)	 (1.025)	
	 	 	 	 	Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
	 	 	 	 	Observations	 28,509	 33,030	 36,884	 41,848	
R-squared	 0.271	 0.258	 0.268	 0.228	
	
Panel	B:	 TFP	growth	between	t	and	t+3	
Sample:	productivity	quartile	in	year	t	 1st		 2nd		 3rd		 4th		
Downstream	HGF	share	 0.002	 0.029***	 0.033***	 0.008	
	
(0.338)	 (3.884)	 (4.701)	 (1.117)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 -0.003	 0.018**	 -0.006	 -0.021**	
	
(-0.324)	 (2.013)	 (-0.688)	 (-2.453)	
Within-industry	HGF	share	 0.005	 0.015**	 0.016***	 0.008	
	
(0.722)	 (2.292)	 (2.662)	 (1.150)	
Demand	 -0.014*	 0.017**	 0.010	 0.016*	
	
(-1.756)	 (2.044)	 (1.373)	 (1.937)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 28,509	 33,030	 36,884	 41,848	
R-squared	 0.229	 0.173	 0.180	 0.169	
Note:	The	table	splits	the	sample	into	4	quartiles	based	on	the	initial	productivity	level	of	firms	and	re-runs	the	
main	regressions	in	Table	2	on	these	subsamples.	The	dependent	variables	are	changes	between	year	t	and	
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t+3,	the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	are	reported	and	t-values	are	reported	
in	parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-industry	(2-digit	NACE)-year	level.	The	explanatory	
variables	show	the	share	of	HGFs	(based	on	3-year	Birch	employment	definition)	in	different	industries	at	the	
same	county,	by	using	the	2-digit	input-out	matrix	from	OECD	STAN.	The	firm	controls	are	log	employment,	
labor	productivity	and	log	capital	per	labor	ratio.	We	split	the	sample	to	productivity	quartile	within	industry-
year	and	take	the	model	quartile	for	each	firm.	
	
Finally,	we	attempt	to	measure	the	geographic	span	of	spillovers	by	constructing	the	variables	at	
different	levels	of	geographic	aggregation	(Table	7).	Transferring	tacit	knowledge,	for	example,	may	
require	face-to-face	interactions	through	personal	relationships	or	labor	mobility.	Supplier-buyer	
relationships	may	operate	over	somewhat	longer	distances.	The	previous	regressions	include	county-
level	measures,	which	are	relatively	broad	geographic	aggregates.	In	contrast,	microregions	are	very	
narrowly	defined,	often	interpreted	as	local	labor	markets.	Recall	that	there	are	20	counties	and	174	
microregions	in	Hungary.	Consequently,	knowledge	spillovers	via	labor	mobility	are	likely	to	show	up	at	
the	microregion	level,	while	broader	supplier-buyer	relationships	may	be	present	at	the	county	level.32		
First,	we	examine	the	spillovers	at	a	more	detailed	geographic	level	and	include	only	the	microregion-
level	spillover	measures	(columns	1	and	3).	Second,	we	include	the	microregion-level	measures	together	
with	the	county-level	measures	(columns	2	and	4).	
Microregion-level	variables	have	very	similar	coefficients	to	county-level	ones,	suggesting	that	the	
channels	at	small	distances	are	not	systematically	different.	Importantly,	both	sets	of	variables	remain	
significant	when	both	the	microregion-	and	county-level	variables	are	included,	suggesting	that	HGF	
externalities	are	stronger	at	short	distances,	which	is	in	line	with	the	possibly	tacit	nature	of	knowledge	
spillovers.	
This	exercise	also	serves	as	a	robustness	check.	Our	results	are	robust	to	different	geographic	
aggregation	levels,	and	the	forces	we	quantify	act	both	at	short	and	longer	distances.	
Table	7	Microregion-level	measures		
	 	
Dependent	variable:	
Variable:	 Aggregation	 Labor	prod.	 Labor	prod	 TFP	 TFP	
	 	
Growth	between	t	and	t+3	
Downstream	HGF	share	 microregion	 0.028***	 0.017***	 0.022***	 0.015***	
	 	
(7.415)	 (4.279)	 (5.108)	 (3.471)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 microregion	 0.005	 0.011***	 -0.000	 0.004	
	 	
(1.337)	 (2.876)	 (-0.102)	 (0.851)	
Within-industry	HGF	share	 microregion	 0.011***	 0.007**	 0.019***	 0.014***	
	 	
(3.684)	 (2.091)	 (5.453)	 (3.772)	
Demand	 microregion	 0.001	 0.000	 0.003	 0.002	
	 	
(0.291)	 (0.139)	 (0.733)	 (0.649)	
Downstream	HGF	share	 county	
	
0.025***	
	
0.017***	
	 	 	
(5.165)	
	
(2.992)	
																																								 																				
32	Note	that	HGFs	in	the	microregions	are	already	included	in	the	county-level	measure;	hence,	their	effect	is	
captured	to	some	extent	by	those	variables.		
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Upstream	HGF	share	 county	
	
-0.007	
	
-0.004	
	 	 	
(-1.181)	
	
(-0.533)	
Within-industry	HGF	share	 county	
	
0.011***	
	
0.013**	
	 	 	
(2.665)	
	
(2.125)	
Demand	 county	
	
0.003	
	
0.011*	
	 	 	
(0.704)	
	
(1.781)	
Controls	
	
yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	
	
yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	
	
yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	
	
yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	
	
140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	
R-squared	 		 0.215	 0.216	 0.152	 0.152	
Note:	The	table	shows	the	main	regressions	in	Table	2	with	spillovers	measures	defined	at	a	finer	level	of	
geographic	aggregation.	The	explanatory	variables	show	the	share	of	HGFs	in	different	industries	at	the	same	
microregion	and	county,	by	using	the	2-digit	input-out	matrix	from	OECD	STAN.	The	dependent	variables	are	
changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	are	reported	
and	t-values	are	reported	in	parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-industry	(2-digit	NACE)-year	
level.	Firm	controls	are	log	employment,	labor	productivity	and	log	capital	per	labor	ratio.	The	definition	of	HGF	is	
the	3-year	Birch	employment	definition.		
	
Let	us	summarize	these	findings	under	two	themes.	First,	they	support	the	hypothesis	that	knowledge	
transfer	plays	a	role	in	the	relationships	we	find.	In	particular,	only	firms	above	a	certain	degree	of	
absorptive	capacity	seem	to	be	able	to	benefit	from	HGF	spillovers,	while	very	productive	firms	may	not	
have	much	to	learn	from	HGFs.	The	finding	that	spillovers	are	stronger	within	very	short	distances	is	also	
in	line	with	the	hypothesis	that,	in	line	with	the	tacit	nature	of	knowledge,	personal	interactions	may	be	
important	in	the	associations	we	observe.	Second,	we	find	that	even	established,	exporting	or	HGF	firms	
can	benefit	from	HGF	spillovers,	and	we	only	find	a	negative	relationship	for	firms	with	very	low	
productivity	levels.	The	presence	of	HGFs	seems	to	be	associated	with	positive	productivity	growth	for	a	
large	set	of	firms.		
4.3. Robustness checks 
A	key	question	is	the	extent	to	which	the	results	are	specific	for	the	HGF	definition	we	have	chosen.	
Table	A2	re-runs	the	regressions	with	the	OECD	HGF	definition	instead	of	the	Birch	definition.	We	find	
that	the	within-industry	spillovers	are	robust	to	this	change	in	definition,	while	the	vertical	spillover	
effects	disappear.	A	key	difference	between	the	two	definitions	is	that	the	OECD	(relative	growth)	
definition	favors	smaller	firms,	while	the	Birch	definition	classifies	many	larger	firms	as	HGFs.	Therefore,	
larger	HGFs,	i.e.	quickly	expanding	buyers,	seem	to	be	needed	for	vertical	spillovers,	while	the	size	of	
HGFs	appears	to	be	less	important	for	horizontal	effects.	This	may	be	in	line	with	the	greater	importance	
of	linkage	effects	in	vertical	spillovers	and	that	of	less	size-dependent	knowledge	effects	in	horizontal	
relationships.	Relatedly,	Lenaerts	and	Merlevede	(2015)	show	that	small	foreign	firms	do	not	generate	
FDI	spillover	effects.	
The	next	robustness	check	relates	to	concerns	about	the	weights	used	in	calculating	the	spillover	
measures.	Recall	that	in	our	main	specification	we	weight	each	HGF	with	its	employment	share.	These	
weights	may	create	an	upward	bias	in	the	spillover	measures	and	establish	a	spurious	relationship	
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between	the	spillover	measures	and	firm	outcomes.	Table	A3	presents	the	results	when	we	do	not	
weight	the	HGFs	when	calculating	the	spillover	measures.	As	expected,	we	find	a	similar	but	somewhat	
weaker	relationship	compared	to	the	main	results.		
Given	the	temporal	assumptions	in	our	empirical	specification,	a	concern	may	arise	that	these	effects	
differ	over	time.	In	Table	A4,	we	investigate	whether	the	measured	relationships	change	over	time	by	
running	cross-sectional	regressions	for	the	different	periods.		We	find	relatively	similar	results	and	no	
obvious	trends	or	structural	breaks.		
We	also	conduct	further	robustness	checks	to	investigate	whether	the	results	are	robust	to	including	
different	sets	of	fixed	effects	in	the	regressions	(Table	A5).	Recall	that	our	baseline	regression	includes	
region-year	and	sector-year	fixed	effects	and	identify	from	variation	across	counties	in	regions	and	
across	industries	within	sectors.	We	control	for	finer	geographic	heterogeneity	with	microregion-year	
fixed	effects	(Table	A5,	columns	1	and	4).	This	set	of	fixed	effects	can	capture	very	fine	local	demand	or	
supply	shocks.	This	change	does	not	affect	the	results	substantially.	Still,	it	is	possible	that	the	results	are	
identified	from	industry-specific	demand	shocks.	To	capture	this,	we	include	county-sector-year	level	
fixed	effects	to	find	that	our	results	are	robust	to	different	ways	of	controlling	for	local	demand	shocks	
(Table	A5,	columns	2	and	5).		
An	additional	concern	is	that	unobserved	firm-level	heterogeneity	may	bias	the	results.	Recall,	however,	
that	firm-level	heterogeneity	is	already	handled	in	the	original	specification	by	differencing	the	
dependent	variable	and	controlling	for	key	firm	characteristics.	Also,	the	explanatory	variables	only	vary	
at	a	more	aggregated	level.	Still,	we	report	specifications	with	firm	fixed	effects	(Table	A5,	columns	3	
and	6)	to	control	fully	for	unobserved	firm-level	heterogeneity	(representing	“fixed	trends”).	The	results	
are	somewhat	sensitive	to	this,	but	we	still	find	a	significant	positive	relationship	between	the	share	of	
HGFs	and	TFP	growth.		
Lastly,	a	relevant	concern	about	our	empirical	specification	is	that	the	share	of	HGFs	can	also	be	
correlated	with	other	industry	characteristics.	For	example,	the	share	of	HGFs	in	an	industry	may	be	
strongly	correlated	with	the	share	of	foreign	firms.	If	foreign	firms	generate	productivity	spillovers,	it	is	
possible	that	our	regressions	can	capture	that.	We	thus	construct	downstream/upstream/within-
industry	measures	from	several	relevant	industry	characteristics	and	control	for	them	(Table	A6).	These	
measures	are	constructed	analogously	to	the	HGF	spillover	measures	described	in	3.2,	but,	rather	than	
aggregating	the	HGF	dummies,	we	aggregate	up	the	foreign-owned	dummies	or	sales	growth	rates.	
HGFs	may	simply	be	more	prevalent	in	industries	with	higher	sales	growth,	and	this	sales	growth,	rather	
than	the	high-growth	firms	themselves,	drives	the	increased	productivity.	To	investigate	this,	we	
calculate	aggregate	sales	for	each	industry-county	combination	between	𝑡	and	𝑡 + 3,	and	use	them	to	
create	the	downstream,	upstream,	and	within-industry	measures.33	Controlling	for	changes	in	industry-
level	sales	does	not	change	our	results	significantly:	HGF	activity	itself,	rather	than	sales	growth	seems	
to	be	associated	with	productivity	change	(Table	A6,	column	1).	
																																								 																				
33	Note	that	the	“demand”	variable	already	present	in	the	main	specification	captures	demand	growth	in	
downstream	industries.	
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We	also	check	whether	our	results	are	driven	by	a	correlation	between	the	share	of	globally	integrated	
firms	and	HGFs.	We	control	for	the	share	of	foreign	firms	(Table	A6,	column	2).	Note	that	this	is	indeed	
the	FDI	spillover	equation	in	Javorcik	(2004)	with	the	additional	HGF	spillover	measures.	As	with	the	FDI	
spillover	literature,	we	find	effects	consistent	with	positive	downstream	and	horizontal	spillovers.	These	
variables	are	correlated	with	HGF	share	and	reduce	the	point	estimates	for	the	HGF	measures,	yet	the	
effects	remain	significant.	As	an	additional	proxy	for	internationalization,	we	control	for	the	share	of	
exporters	(Table	A6,	column	3).	This	is,	naturally,	strongly	correlated	with	the	FDI	share	at	the	industry	
level,	and	its	inclusion	yields	very	similar	results	to	column	2.	
HGFs	may	simply	be	more	prevalent	in	more	innovative	or	more	high-tech	sectors.	We	thus	control	for	
the	share	of	innovative	firms	at	the	industry-level	(Table	A6,	column	4).	We	rely	on	data	from	the	
Community	Innovation	Survey.	We	find	stronger	productivity	growth	in	industries	with	more	innovative	
firms	and	in	industries	supplying	more	innovative	industries.	The	regressions	yield	positive	and	mostly	
significant	coefficients	for	the	HGF	measures,	but	they	are	substantially	smaller	than	in	the	baseline	
model.	Finally,	we	control	for	the	industry’s	technology	by	including	the	average	productivity	of	the	
vertically	related	sectors	(Table	A6,	column	5).	We	find	that	firms	that	are	in	more	productive	industries	
or	are	supplying	industries	with	more	productive	firms	experience	higher	productivity	growth.	The	
coefficient	for	the	within-industry	HGF	measure	again	becomes	smaller	but	remains	significant.		
These	results	show	that	the	HGF	share	in	industries	is	indeed	correlated	with	technology	level	and	
international	integration.	These	industry-level	variables	explain	a	significant	part	of	the	association	
between	HGF	share	in	vertically	related	industries	and	productivity	growth,	but	even	conditional	on	
these	factors,	a	higher	HGF	share	seems	to	be	associated	with	a	premium	in	productivity	growth.	
5. Conclusions 
HGFs	have	a	disproportionate	ability	to	create	jobs	and	generate	output.	But	there	is	less	evidence	and	
understanding	about	whether	their	contribution	to	economic	growth	outweighs	the	costs	they	impose	
on	other	firms.	In	order	to	examine	the	impact	of	HGFs	on	the	economy,	we	exploit	detailed	
administrative	microdata	from	Hungary.	Productivity	growth	is	stronger	when	firms	operate	in	
industries	with	more	HGFs	or	supply	such	industries.	These	results	are	in	line	with	firms	benefiting	from	
knowledge	spillovers	or	increased	demand	from	HGFs.	The	increase	in	productivity	results	from	a	
combination	of	increased	markups	and	physical	productivity.	Not	only	do	HGFs	generate	positive	
spillovers,	but	they	also	benefit	more	firms	in	the	middle	of	the	productivity	distribution.	Firms	in	the	
bottom	quartile	of	the	distribution	are	not	productive	enough	to	take	more	of	and	advantage	of	HGFs’	
demand.	Firms	in	the	top	quartile	of	the	distribution	have	access	to	wider	markets	and	do	not	depend	
on	HGFs	as	much.	Moreover,	manufacturing	firms	are	better	able	to	benefit	from	the	presence	of	HGFs	
than	services	firms.	The	relationship	between	HGF	presence	and	firm	performance	is	not	heterogeneous	
by	firm	age	or	export	status.	Lastly,	the	spillover	effects	are	still	present	at	short	distances,	and	the	
effects	are	stronger,	suggesting	that	personal	interactions	may	be	important	for	our	results.		
The	results	are	robust	to	alternative	definitions	of	HGF	spillovers	measures,	productivity	measures,	
samples,	and	different	sets	of	fixed	effects	and	industry	controls.	As	discussed	in	the	paper,	establishing	
causality	presents	significant	econometric	challenges.	The	fact	that	the	relationship	between	HGF	shares	
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and	productivity	gains	continues	to	hold	when	controlling	for	a	plethora	of	factors	and	is	not	sensitive	to	
several	robustness	checks	gives	us	confidence	in	the	results.		
The	paper	provides	evidence	for	policymakers	who	may	be	concerned	about	directing	scarce	resources	
towards	supporting	HGFs,	instead	of	using	these	resources	for	firms	in	other	parts	of	the	economy.	
Nevertheless,	it	also	highlights	the	fact	that	the	attention	and	resources	given	to	HGFs	can	benefit	other	
firms	in	the	economy.		
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Appendix 
Table	A1	Share	of	firms	with	HGF	status	(3-year	Birch	employment	growth	definition)	
Panel	A:	Birch	definition	
	
1998	 2001	 2004	 2007	 2009	 2011	 Total	
Low-tech	mfg	 6.2%	 5.8%	 4.4%	 6.4%	 6.8%	 5.9%	 5.9%	
Medium-low	
tech	mfg	 7.2%	 6.8%	 6.9%	 4.7%	 9.5%	 8.3%	 7.1%	
Medium-high	
tech	mfg	 8.0%	 7.7%	 9.4%	 7.2%	 12.6%	 9.6%	 9.1%	
High-tech	mfg	 13.6%	 12.2%	 19.7%	 19.4%	 22.7%	 12.6%	 17.0%	
KIS	 3.2%	 3.7%	 4.2%	 4.8%	 4.7%	 4.7%	 4.4%	
LKIS	 4.7%	 4.8%	 3.5%	 4.3%	 3.2%	 3.4%	 3.9%	
Construction	 3.8%	 3.7%	 3.3%	 3.6%	 2.4%	 3.4%	 3.3%	
Electricity,	
water	etc	 2.4%	 5.1%	 4.0%	 9.6%	 8.0%	 8.4%	 6.6%	
Total	 5.2%	 5.1%	 4.4%	 4.8%	 4.9%	 4.6%	 4.8%	
Panel	B:	OECD	definition	
	
1998	 2001	 2004	 2007	 2009	 2011	 Total	
Low-tech	mfg	 8.5%	 5.2%	 5.1%	 3.9%	 5.5%	 5.1%	 5.5%	
Medium-low	
tech	mfg	 8.8%	 6.5%	 6.6%	 2.9%	 7.0%	 5.9%	 6.1%	
Medium-high	
tech	mfg	 8.6%	 7.1%	 6.5%	 3.6%	 4.9%	 3.4%	 5.7%	
High-tech	mfg	 8.7%	 8.1%	 13.4%	 10.1%	 10.5%	 4.2%	 9.0%	
KIS	 5.5%	 6.1%	 7.4%	 5.3%	 6.2%	 5.6%	 6.0%	
LKIS	 9.7%	 7.1%	 5.9%	 4.6%	 4.5%	 4.8%	 5.8%	
Construction	 9.8%	 6.7%	 7.3%	 4.1%	 4.4%	 6.5%	 6.2%	
Electricity,	
water	etc	 1.2%	 5.4%	 4.7%	 4.7%	 6.4%	 7.0%	 5.1%	
Total	 9.0%	 6.7%	 6.3%	 4.3%	 5.1%	 5.2%	 5.9%	
Note:	The	table	shows	the	share	of	HGFs	in	the	regression	sample.	Panel	A	and	B	show	the	share	of	HGFs	according	
to	the	3-year	definition,	based	on	employment.	KIS	stands	for	Knowledge	Intensive	Services,	and	LKIS	for	Less	
Knowledge	Intensive	Services.	Sector	types	are	defined	based	on	the	Eurostat	definition.	
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Table	A2	Main	results	when	using	the	OECD3	definition	
		 Productivity		 Size		 Income		
	Dependent:	 Labor	prod.	 TFP	 Emp.	(ln)	 Sales	(ln)	
av.	wage	
(ln)	 ROA	
Downstream	HGF	share	 0.004	 0.005	 -0.000	 0.003	 0.005	 0.003	
	
(0.987)	 (0.903)	 (-0.062)	 (0.552)	 (0.923)	 (0.688)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 0.007	 0.003	 0.000	 0.003	 0.005	 0.004	
	
(1.387)	 (0.480)	 (0.042)	 (0.530)	 (0.759)	 (0.848)	
Within-industry	HGF	
share	 0.016***	 0.024***	 0.002	 0.010***	 -0.002	 0.014***	
	
(4.878)	 (4.539)	 (0.624)	 (2.844)	 (-0.388)	 (4.414)	
Demand	 0.005	 0.012**	 0.009*	 0.014***	 0.012**	 -0.002	
	
(1.222)	 (2.054)	 (1.920)	 (2.847)	 (2.548)	 (-0.483)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	
R-squared	 0.214	 0.151	 0.085	 0.069	 0.161	 0.095	
Note:	The	table	replicates	Table	2	but	relying	on	the	3-year	OECD	instead	of	the	Birch	definition.	The	dependent	
variables	are	changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	
are	reported	and	t-values	are	reported	in	parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-industry	(2-digit	
NACE)-year	level.	Firms	are	classified	as	HGFs	based	on	the	3-year	OECD	employment	definition.		
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Table	A3	Main	results	when	using	unweighted	spillover	measures	
		 Productivity		 Size		 Income		
Dependent:	 Labor	prod.	 TFP	 Emp.	(ln)	 Sales	(ln)	
av.	wage	
(ln)	 ROA	
Downstream	HGF	
share	 0.038***	 0.033***	 -0.002	 0.021***	 0.025***	 0.018***	
	
(9.905)	 (6.451)	 (-0.395)	 (4.769)	 (5.778)	 (4.315)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 0.015***	 0.010*	 0.002	 0.012***	 0.008	 0.004	
	
(3.969)	 (1.764)	 (0.629)	 (2.669)	 (1.568)	 (0.951)	
Within-industry	HGF	
share	 0.002	 0.008**	 0.013***	 0.004	 -0.010***	 0.008**	
	
(0.779)	 (2.154)	 (3.999)	 (1.036)	 (-3.112)	 (2.442)	
Demand	 0.001	 0.010	 0.009**	 0.012**	 0.009*	 -0.003	
	
(0.225)	 (1.607)	 (1.999)	 (2.264)	 (1.900)	 (-0.753)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	 140,271	
R-squared	 0.216	 0.152	 0.085	 0.070	 0.162	 0.095	
Note:	This	table	replicates	Table	2,	but	spillover	measures	are	not	weighted	by	employment	but	by	the	number	of	
HGFs	out	of	all	firms	in	a	given	sector-county	pair.	The	dependent	variables	are	changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	
the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	are	reported	and	t-values	are	reported	in	
parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-industry	(2-digit	NACE)-year	level.	Firms	are	classified	as	
HGFs	based	on	the	3-year	Birch	employment	definition.	
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Table	A4	Cross-sectional	identification	
Dependent:	 Labor	productivity	growth	between	t	and	t+3	
Year	 1998	 2001	 2004	 2007	 2009	 2011	
Downstream	HGF	
share	 0.029***	 0.008	 0.034***	 0.014	 0.076***	 0.027***	
	
(3.194)	 (0.926)	 (3.171)	 (1.520)	 (5.616)	 (3.116)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 0.033***	 0.006	 -0.016	 -0.002	 -0.008	 -0.010	
	
(2.811)	 (0.581)	 (-1.329)	 (-0.196)	 (-0.489)	 (-0.819)	
Within-industry	HGF	
share	 0.021***	 0.009	 0.017*	 0.021***	 -0.001	 0.022**	
	
(2.588)	 (1.049)	 (1.826)	 (2.962)	 (-0.112)	 (2.223)	
Demand	 0.007	 0.035***	 0.007	 -0.000	 -0.012	 -0.009	
	
(0.685)	 (3.889)	 (0.938)	 (-0.028)	 (-0.929)	 (-0.801)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 16,288	 20,376	 26,327	 26,595	 24,910	 25,775	
R-squared	 0.239	 0.185	 0.250	 0.188	 0.159	 0.160	
Dependent:	 TFP	growth	between	t	and	t+3	
Year	 1998	 2001	 2004	 2007	 2009	 2011	
Downstream	HGF	
share	 0.028*	 -0.041***	 0.034***	 0.048***	 0.029**	 0.031***	
	
(1.862)	 (-3.219)	 (2.751)	 (3.558)	 (2.567)	 (3.011)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 0.033	 0.004	 -0.020	 -0.013	 0.001	 -0.010	
	
(1.560)	 (0.209)	 (-1.170)	 (-0.748)	 (0.043)	 (-0.754)	
Within-industry	HGF	
share	 0.025	 0.016	 0.017	 0.033**	 0.005	 0.018	
	
(1.496)	 (1.327)	 (1.323)	 (1.969)	 (0.405)	 (1.536)	
Demand	 0.009	 0.022*	 0.023***	 0.010	 -0.009	 -0.004	
	
(0.439)	 (1.775)	 (2.870)	 (0.707)	 (-0.624)	 (-0.325)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 16,288	 20,376	 26,327	 26,595	 24,910	 25,775	
R-squared	 0.139	 0.134	 0.203	 0.127	 0.129	 0.140	
Note:	This	table	re-runs	the	main	regressions	on	the	subsamples	from	different	periods.	The	dependent	variables	
are	changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	are	
reported	and	t-values	are	reported	in	parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-industry	(2-digit	
NACE)-year	level.	The	firm	controls	are	log	employment,	labor	productivity	and	log	capital	per	labor	ratio.		
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Table	A5	Different	sets	of	fixed	effects	
Dependent:	 Labor	productivity	 TFP	
		 Growth	between	t	and	t+3	
Downstream	HGF	share	 0.034***	 0.051***	 0.010	 0.023***	 0.038***	 0.107***	
	
(7.460)	 (9.183)	 (1.036)	 (4.244)	 (6.071)	 (7.508)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 -0.000	 0.039**	 -0.005	 -0.003	 0.006	 -0.009	
	
(-0.035)	 (2.423)	 (-0.353)	 (-0.271)	 (0.340)	 (-0.475)	
Within-industry	HGF	share	 0.015***	 0.011**	 0.006	 0.019***	 0.018***	 0.017***	
	
(3.934)	 (2.415)	 (1.281)	 (3.425)	 (2.579)	 (2.675)	
Demand	 0.006	 0.016**	 -0.009**	 0.020**	 0.040***	 0.006	
	
(1.211)	 (2.069)	 (-2.236)	 (2.552)	 (4.154)	 (1.066)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
microregion-year	FE	 yes	
	 	
yes	
	 	County-sector-year	FE	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	Firm	FE	
	 	
yes	
	 	
yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 140,271	 140,242	 121,292	 140,271	 140,242	 121,292	
R-squared	 0.224	 0.224	 0.595	 0.160	 0.163	 0.539	
Note:	The	table	extends	the	main	regression	in	Table	2	with	different	sets	of	fixed	effects:	In	columns	(1)	and	(4)	it	
more	detailed	geographical	fixed	effects	(column	1	and	4);	sector-year	fixed	effects	(column	2	and	5);	firm	fixed	
effects	(column	3	and	6).	The	explanatory	variables	show	the	share	of	HGFs	in	different	industries	at	the	same	
microregion	and	county,	by	using	the	2-digit	input-out	matrix	from	OECD	STAN.	The	dependent	variables	are	
changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	are	reported	
and	t-values	are	reported	in	parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-industry	(2-digit	NACE)-year	
level.	The	firm	controls	are	log	employment,	labor	productivity	and	log	capital	per	labor	ratio.	The	definition	of	
HGF	is	the	3-year	Birch	employment	definition.	Small	firms	are	firms	with	less	than	5	employees.	
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Table	A6	Controlling	for	other	industry	characteristics	
	
Labor	productivity	change	between	t	and	t+3	
Control:	 Sales	growth	 Foreign	share	
Exporter	
share	
Innovative	
firm	share	
Average	labor	
prod	
Downstream	HGF	share	 0.033***	 0.011**	 0.006	 0.010*	 0.007	
	
(7.408)	 (2.084)	 (1.049)	 (1.825)	 (1.612)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 -0.001	 0.003	 0.004	 0.000	 0.000	
	
(-0.135)	 (0.599)	 (0.868)	 (0.060)	 (0.006)	
Within-industry	HGF	share	 0.015***	 0.011***	 0.012***	 0.008**	 0.009***	
	
(3.753)	 (2.639)	 (3.051)	 (2.081)	 (2.645)	
Demand	 0.009*	 0.003	 0.002	 -0.001	 -0.002	
	
(1.852)	 (0.615)	 (0.503)	 (-0.328)	 (-0.540)	
Control	Downstream	
	
0.038***	 0.036***	 0.056***	 0.083***	
	 	
(4.954)	 (4.848)	 (8.430)	 (16.512)	
Control	upstream	 -0.011**	 -0.005	 -0.005	 -0.003	 0.038***	
	
(-2.480)	 (-0.656)	 (-0.653)	 (-0.532)	 (6.122)	
Control	same	sector	 0.006*	 0.018***	 0.028***	 0.033***	 -0.006	
	
(1.671)	 (3.391)	 (4.399)	 (8.996)	 (-1.104)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 140,271	 136,771	 136,771	 140,271	 140,271	
R-squared	 0.215	 0.216	 0.216	 0.216	 0.219	
Panel	B:	TFP	change	between	t	and	t+3	
Added	control	variable:	 Sales	growth	 Foreign	share	
Exporter	
share	
Innovative	
firm	share	
Average	labor	
prod	
Downstream	HGF	share	 0.023***	 -0.002	 -0.003	 0.001	 0.003	
	
(4.376)	 (-0.328)	 (-0.410)	 (0.188)	 (0.604)	
Upstream	HGF	share	 -0.001	 0.005	 0.007	 -0.001	 -0.001	
	
(-0.186)	 (0.647)	 (1.076)	 (-0.112)	 (-0.144)	
Within-industry	HGF	share	 0.019***	 0.014**	 0.014***	 0.012**	 0.008**	
	
(3.371)	 (2.493)	 (2.929)	 (2.104)	 (2.228)	
Demand	 0.016**	 0.012**	 0.012**	 0.005	 0.002	
	
(2.123)	 (2.025)	 (2.040)	 (0.963)	 (0.488)	
Control	downstream	
	
0.048***	 0.031***	 0.057***	 0.167***	
	 	
(4.765)	 (3.568)	 (7.108)	 (35.277)	
Control	upstream	 -0.009	 -0.022**	 -0.022**	 -0.001	 0.019***	
	
(-1.239)	 (-2.352)	 (-2.506)	 (-0.207)	 (2.950)	
Control	same	sector	 0.008*	 0.028***	 0.071***	 0.047***	 -0.002	
	
(1.781)	 (3.957)	 (8.784)	 (11.561)	 (-0.405)	
Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
34	
	
region-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
sector-year	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Firm	controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 140,271	 136,771	 136,771	 140,271	 140,271	
R-squared	 0.152	 0.153	 0.154	 0.153	 0.164	
Note:	The	table	extends	the	main	regressions	in	Table	2	with	controlling	for	different	industry-level	characteristics.	
The	explanatory	variables	show	the	share	of	HGFs	in	different	industries	at	the	same	microregion	and	county,	by	
using	the	2-digit	input-out	matrix	from	OECD	STAN.	The	dependent	variables	are	changes	between	year	t	and	t+3,	
the	explanatory	variables	are	measured	at	time	t.	Beta	coefficients	are	reported	and	t-values	are	reported	in	
parentheses.	Standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	county-industry	(2-digit	NACE)-year	level.	The	firm	controls	are	
log	employment,	labor	productivity	and	log	capital	per	labor	ratio.	Firms	are	classified	as	HGFs	based	on	the	3-year	
Birch	employment	definition.	In	each	column	a	different	additional	control	variable	is	considered,	and	its	name	is	
reported	at	the	top	of	the	column.	Small	firms	are	firms	with	less	than	5	employees	
	
	
